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1 Introduction and Motivation
The recent financial crisis made it painfully clear that bank risk can arise from heavy
reliance on certain types of funding and/or assets, for example the relative exposure to
real estate loans or reliance on wholesale funding. Risk consideration in this respect
has not previously been explicitly recognized in the literature assessing bank efficiency.
Therefore it is important to understand the implications on bank performance measures,
of using extreme rather than well-balanced funding or asset portfolios, as was evidently
the case for some banks during the recent crisis.
On an abstract level, the definition of true risk is not immediately clear in the fi-
nancial literature. Holton (2004) makes this point clear: Risk depends on the notions of
exposure and uncertainty, neither of which can be defined operationally. Probabilities
quantify perceived uncertainty. The litmus test for exposure is “would we care if we
were. . . ”-it is a hypothetical and unobserved test. Therefore, at best, we can opera-
tionally define our perception of risk.
In the banking literature, several studies have made significant contributions to the
understanding of the nature of banking and perceived risks. For instance, Diamond and
Dybvig (1983) explain why bank contracts are less stable than other types of financial
contracts: demand deposit contracts allow lenders to withdraw money when needed thus
provide liquidity; this service provided by banks of transforming illiquid assets into liquid
liabilities leave banks vulnerable to runs which occur because there are multiple equi-
libria with differing confidence levels. Diamond and Rajan (2001) further demonstrate
that this fragile nature associated with bank runs and bank capital structure commits
banks to creating liquidity, enabling depositors to withdraw when needed while buffer-
ing borrowers from depositors’ liquidity needs. Other than liquidity risk, banks also face
other types of risks such as default risk arising from default of borrowers and market risk
arising from the change of market conditions (such as interest rates, exchange rates etc)
resulting in potential losses in banks’ trading portfolio. With the rising of structured
finance prior to the crisis, a recent study by Coval et al. (2009) demonstrates how during
the process of pooling and tranching of structured financial products, the default risk
of senior tranches can be concentrated in systematically adverse economic states. They
show that this systemic risk exposure is not appropriately priced by investors (which
include banks) who invest in structured financial products. This shows banks are often
exposed to systemic risks too.
The method proposed in the paper is motivated by identifying bank managers’ per-
ceptions of risks (which could be related to all types of risk mentioned above) reflected
in their funding structures and asset portfolios, while assessing bank efficiency.
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is often used to assess the efficiency of banks.
In the ratio (multiplier) formulation of DEA, efficiency is estimated as the ratio of a
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weighted sum of outputs over a weighted sum of inputs. The weights (multipliers) for
the inputs and outputs are free variables in the optimization maximizing the efficiency
measure for each bank, subject only to the constraint that the efficiency scores for all
banks must be between 0 and 1 when applying those weights. If no further restrictions
are imposed on the weights, in order to maximize the efficiency for a bank, high weights
are placed on variables it performs relatively well on, for examples outputs it produces
a lot of, and low weights are placed on variables it performs relatively poorly on, for
example inputs it uses a lot of. Therefore, banks with extreme funding or asset portfolios
will also prefer, or be assigned, extreme choices of weights in the efficiency assessment.
Furthermore, for a bank with the highest ratio of any one output to any one input in
the constant returns to scale (CRS) models employed here, weights can be used that
result in the largest possible efficiency score of one and thus such banks become “ef-
ficient by default”, simply because the extreme funding or asset portfolios means that
it cannot really be compared to any other bank(s) in the efficiency assessment1. A
potentially unfortunate consequence of this characteristic of DEA is that the method
implicitly rewards extreme behaviour in terms of the composition of the input- and out-
put portfolios. In some cases, like that of bank performance assessment, extreme input-
and output (funding or asset) portfolios are associated with high risks, which should be
properly accounted for, rather than necessarily rewarded, in the assessment. Since the
weights can be interpreted as relative prices for the inputs and outputs, we argue that a
proper choice of weights should also reflect the underlying risks of the variable such that
the weights reflect risk adjusted prices. This is particularly pertinent for bank efficiency
measurement, since studies have shown that banks’ differ wildly in their assessments of
the risks associated with certain assets.
In this paper we suggest that weight restrictions should be used in cases like this,
to counter the inclination towards choosing extreme weights that do not account for
the risk reflected in extreme input- and output portfolios. We specifically consider two
different weight restricted DEA models to measure bank performance, where we restrict
the weights attached to different types of funding and other inputs, in a model con-
cerning the transformation of funding and other inputs into assets, and also restrict the
weights on the different types of loans and other assets in a second model concerning the
transformation of assets into income. The (relative) weights are restricted to having to
belong to ranges determined from the average (relative) weights used across the efficient
facets of the frontier. This way, efficiency scores are obtained by comparing all banks,
regardless of their mixes of inputs and outputs in the two models and corresponding
differences in preferred weights, to a balanced set of weights. As robustness checks,
we also apply weight restrictions based on the average observed unit and furthermore
weight restrictions based on the median rather than mean values. As detailed in the
following, the contribution of our proposed method comprises two aspects: One related
1Under the alternative variable returns to scale assumption this problem is actually exacerbated,
since any bank with the highest value of any one output or the lowest value on any input will also be
efficient by default.
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to performance measurement and the other concerning regulation.
In terms of the first contribution of this paper related to bank efficiency measure-
ment, it is important to note that the standard DEA models (c.f. Charnes et al., 1978)
commonly used in the literature to measure bank performance (c.f. e.g. Berger and
Humphrey, 1997 and Berger, 2007) are not well suited to dealing with bank risks re-
flected in their asset or funding portfolios, c.f. the discussion above. Despite the fact
that standard DEA is the approach most widely used in the literature to measure bank
performance, this feature of the DEA models makes it unsatisfactory for the assessment
of the performance of banks where the use of extreme input and output portfolios might
mean risky behaviour - a problem which has never been more apparent and relevant
than during the recent financial crisis.
It is worth noting that restricting weights can make previously efficient funding and
asset portfolios inefficient. But we are not proposing that banks should restrict (the
mixes within) their input-output portfolios to belonging to specific ranges or that there
exists a unique good risk portfolio. Our weight restrictions are indirectly defined from
the weights of the efficient banks (via the corresponding fully dimensional efficient facets,
c.f. Section 3). So the set of restricted weights depends on the average risk judgement
of all included banks; it is not a pre-determined or unique set. Using the actual crisis
as our context, we are proposing that when evaluating efficiency in the banking sec-
tor, balanced risk judgements are preferred to extreme risk judgements at the practice
level. Different sets of weight restrictions can be used in different contexts to achieve
the purpose of measuring bank efficiency without being biased by banks’ extreme risk
judgements. As rightly pointed out by Thanassoulis and Allen (1998), also in the con-
text of weight restricted DEA models, “. . . it is not so much what ranges of input and
output weights are permissible but rather how prior judgements on the relative values
of input and output variables can be clarified and incorporated in DEA assessments.”
(p. 586). Another motivation for using average weights is the possible trade-off between
risk and efficiency. On the one hand, an extremely conservative risk attitude is likely
to result in inefficiency in the first place; on the other hand, apparently efficient banks
may be extremely risky. Therefore we believe that the use of balanced weights across
all banks is preferable to extreme weights for individual banks, which can be achieved
through weight restrictions based on the average weights.
In terms of the second contribution of the paper, we posit that our method can be
used as a regulatory tool to create reference points to complement supervisory bench-
marks for risk currently used by regulators, as will be discussed further in Section 5.3
below.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: In section 2 we provide a brief review
of selected literature that links DEA measurement of bank efficiency to bank risk. In
section 3 the theoretical DEA models, both without and with weight restrictions, used
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to assess the efficiencies of the banks are defined. Section 4 provides a description of
the data, models and variables used for the analysis and section 5 comprises the results.
Finally section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Selected literature review: Bank efficiency measurement
and risk
The recent financial crisis highlighted bank’s risks associated with its funding structure,
as e.g. over-reliance on wholesale funding exposes a bank to excessive risk if there is a
sudden withdrawal of funding in the wholesale funding market, as was the case during
the crisis. This is supported by emerging empirical evidence in the wake of the financial
crisis. For instance, Bologna (2011) finds evidence from U.S. banks (2007-2009) that
banks relying heavily on non-retail deposit or less stable deposit funding are more likely
to fail. Vazquez and Federico (2012), considering both European and U.S. banks during
2001-09, also suggest that the strength of a bank’s funding liquidity (measured by the
proportion of long-term illiquid assets that are funded with liabilities that are either
long-term or deemed to be stable (such as core deposits)) prior to the crisis is negatively
related to the bank’s probability to fail. Consistent with the above European and U.S.
findings, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2009), based on world-wide data, show that a
sizeable proportion of banks attract most of their short-term funding from non-retail
deposits at a cost of increased bank fragility. The global financial crisis therefore raised
questions regarding bank risk management practices and triggered a thorough revision
of the regulatory and supervisory frameworks in the new Basel III proposals with stricter
regulations on funding and leverage (BIS, 2010).
Besides bank fragility associated with liquidity creation and risks associated with
banks’ unstable funding structures, the exposure of banks’ asset portfolios is also an
important concern common to many previous crises in history. It is well known that
the burst of the real estate bubble in the United States triggered the recent crisis, which
quickly spread to other countries. The cross-country empirical analysis by Claessens et
al. (2010) confirms, that countries which had closer links with the U.S. financial system
or direct exposure to asset backed securities (i.e. those closer to patient zero) were the
first to be affected. Also, those countries displaying features such as rapid credit growth
and high leverage, as well as asset price bubbles, were the most severely hurt.
However, banks risks discussed above, which relates specifically to the mixes of fund-
ing sources and/or assets, is largely ignored in the bank efficiency literature2. Laeven
(1990) is amongst the earliest to consider a risk measure in the analysis of bank effi-
ciency and uses excessive loan growth, defined as the growth above the level of loans
2Note that the selected literature considered here is used to motivate the adoption of weight-restricted
data envelopment analysis models for bank efficiency assessment, rather than meant as a meta-analysis
of this very large body of literature.
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that a bank would have provided if it would have put its inputs to use as efficiently as
in a defined base year, as their measure of risk. Hughes et al. (2001) use a best-practice
risk-return frontier to measure inefficiency, where expected return is obtained from a
managerial utility maximising profit function. Therefore, in their framework, instead of
the common considerations of profit maximisation or cost minimisation, a bank is con-
sidered efficient if the trade-off between risk and expected return is made with minimum
agency cost. More recently, Settlage et al. (2009) propose a DEA model in which banks
are assumed to behave as mean-variance utility maximisers. More specifically, their
model determines the maximum level of profits given the additional constraint that the
observed level of variance of a bank’s portfolio (an indicator of risk) cannot be exceeded.
This maximum level of expected profit is then compared to the observed level of profits,
with equality implying risk-adjusted efficiency. Other studies incorporate risk measures
directly into their models to control for risk. For instance, Berg et al. (1992) and Hughes
and Mester (1993) included non-performing loans as an input. Altunbas et al. (2001) use
equity capital and Pastor and Serrano (2005) incorporate loan loss provisions in their
efficiency estimations to control for risk. There are also studies treating risk as an exter-
nal factor and analysing the effect of risk on efficiency in two-stage DEA or Stochastic
Frontier Analysis3 models, see for instance Chang (1999), Carvallo and Kasman (2005),
Yildirim and Philippatos (2007) and Koutsomanoli-Filippaki and Mamatzakis (2011).
The present work differs from the above studies by proposing a way to incorporate
the consideration of risk into the efficiency measurement model without explicitly quan-
tifying the risk beforehand. Based on the lessons learned during the recent financial
crisis, we suggest that, besides explicit risk measures such as loan quality (along the
lines of what is used in some of the above studies), certain risk as discussed above is
implicitly reflected in banks’ business models through their reliance on certain inputs
and/or outputs. Therefore we, as well as controlling for loan quality and loan loss pro-
vision (as explained in section 4), account for this implicit risk element by restricting
the weights that are allowed for inputs and outputs in the efficiency measurement. This
way, the efficiency model ensures that the risks associated with extreme reliance on cer-
tain inputs and/or outputs are properly accounted for in the efficiency assessment, since
the banks are not allowed to use correspondingly extreme weights for those variables.
Extreme reliance on certain assets or funding sources can arise from both extreme risk
preferences and from extreme risk judgements at the practice level. To avoid discour-
aging heterogeneity in risk preferences regarding the assets or funding portfolios, whilst
constraining heterogeneity in risk judgements of particular types of funding or assets,
we impose restrictions on weights rather than directly on the assets or funding portfolios.
The research in this paper is also related to another strand of literature discussing
the relationship between risk and efficiency. As argued by Berger et al. (1997), the re-
3Stochastic Frontier Analysis is parametric analysis of efficiency based on a frontier function (such as
a production or cost function). It was first proposed by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen
and van den Broeck (1977) independently.
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lationship between efficiency and risk can be in different directions. If bank managers
are bad at managing the banks efficiently, the poor management may lead to both low
efficiency as well as high levels of problem loans, i.e. higher risk (bad management hy-
pothesis). Alternatively, short-run “inefficiency” of banks devoting resources to loan
underwriting and monitoring may lead to less problem loans in the long run, indicat-
ing a risk-efficiency trade off (skimping hypothesis). Or the other way around, a bank
may take higher risk to pursue short-run efficiency. Similarly, a bank which is currently
inefficient may be expected to take higher risk in the near future (also known as the
moral hazard hypothesis). Using U.S. evidence, Berger et al. (1997) and Kwan and
Eisenbeis (1997) show that poorly performing banks in the U.S. are more vulnerable to
risk-taking and increases in problem loans (bad management). However, Altunbas et al.
(2007) do not find a positive relationship between inefficiency and bank risk-taking in
Europe. Instead, inefficient banks appear to be less risky (skimping). By contrast, using
a slightly different sample in Europe, Williams (2004) finds that poorly managed banks
tend to make more poor quality loans, consistent with the U.S. evidence. More recently,
Fiordelisi et al. (2011) suggest that banks lagging behind in their efficiency levels might
expect higher risks in the near future (moral hazard). Wanke et al. (2014) use a sample
of Brazilian banks to illustrate that bank management slacks, or input saving or output
enhancement potentials, could be good proxies for an eventual financial distress situa-
tion. This idea is related to the bad management hypothesis.
The research setting in this paper is quite different from this strand of literature as
we are primarily interested in proposing an approach to measuring bank efficiency that
more directly incorporates certain risk elements. But the behaviour indicated by the
skimping hypothesis makes our approach of measuring bank efficiency (more precisely,
the weight-restricted DEA model) relevant and worthwhile: Bank managers may have
incentives to take risks in order to boost short-run performance. Since certain risks are
reflected in banks’ funding and asset portfolio, extreme risk judgements (weights) might
have been motivated by short-run profitability. In standard DEA models these extreme
judgements would make the corresponding banks appear efficient whereas that is not
the case in our proposed weight-restricted models, which more directly account for the
associated risks. In the next section we formally define the DEA models used to analyse
bank efficiency with and without weight restrictions.
3 Methodology
Let N be the set of n observed banks, j = 1, . . . , n described in section 4.1 below.
The banks are observed in four different years, t=2006, . . . ,2009, and within each DEA
model a bank is viewed as using k = 1, . . . , r inputs to produce l = 1, . . . , s outputs.
The specific variables considered in the two different DEA models (funding-assets and
assets-income respectively) are defined in section 4.3. Let (xkj.t) denote bank j’s con-
sumption of the k’th input in year t and (ylj.t) its production of the l’th output in year
t. Thus bank j in year t is described as (xj.t,yj.t) ∈ Rr+s+ .
7
3.1 Unrestricted DEA models
The unrestricted output-oriented DEA efficiency score ej0.t0 under constant returns to
scale (c.f. Charnes et al., 1978) for bank j0 within a given year t0, (xj0.t0 ,yj0.t0) ∈ Rr+s+ ,
but compared to pooled frontier comprising all banks in all years of the study period, is
in the multiplier form given by
(ej0.t0)
−1 = min
r∑
k=1
vkj0.t0x
k
j0.t0
s.t.
s∑
l=1
ulj0.t0y
l
j0.t0 ≥ 1, (1)
r∑
k=1
vkj0.t0x
k
j.t −
s∑
l=1
ulj0.t0y
l
j.t ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , n, t = 2006, . . . , 2009
vkj0.t0 , u
l
j0.t0 ≥ 0, k = 1, . . . , r, l = 1, . . . , s,
where the variables vj0.t0 ∈ Rr+ and uj0.t0 ∈ Rs+ are the weights assigned to the inputs
and outputs by the bank under analysis (bank j0) in the specific year t0.
When optimizing the normal unrestricted DEA multiplier model (1) above, the bank
under analysis (xj0.t0 ,yj0.t0) will be assigned the weights that makes it appear as efficient
as possible, subject only to the constraints that all weights are non-negative and that
no bank j ∈ N in any year t can have an efficiency score vj0.t0xj.tuj0.t0yj.t ≥ 1 with that set of
weights.
Various forms of weight restrictions have been proposed in the literature to prevent
the selection of what is deemed inappropriate weights, including assigning weights of
zero to inputs and/or outputs that the unit performs relatively poorly on or, in this
case, using extreme judgements of the risks associated with certain funding sources or
assets. Allen et al. (1997) provide a survey of studies on weight restrictions and value
judgements in DEA. Of particular relevance to this paper is Charnes et al. (1990)’s cone
ratio approach where relative weights, i.e. ratios of weights, are restricted to having to
belong to certain cones typically defined based on external expert opinions and/or a set
of model units, thus tightening the efficiency assessment. Similar to that approach we in
this study use relative weight restrictions, that is, impose restrictions on ratios of weights.
Instead of basing the weight restrictions on expert opinions, or a set of model banks,
relative weight restrictions are here defined as a range around the average weight for one
variable relative to a range around the average weight for another variable. This is done
for pairs of weights corresponding to certain extreme mixes of inputs and/or outputs.
This way, the weights for any bank are restricted to only belonging to a certain range on
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one input or output relative to the weight on another input or output; for example, the
banks can only be assessed using a certain range of weights assigned to wholesale fund-
ing relative to the weight on retail funding. It is interesting to note that, in the setting
of cost efficiency of bank branches, Camanho and Dyson (2003) use weight restrictions
innovatively to overcome the problem of uncertain input prices to enhance cost efficiency
measurement. The application of weight restrictions presented in this study focuses on
accounting for banks’ extreme risk judgement associated with the value the input and
output, thus to improve the practice of bank efficiency measurement. Restrictions on the
ratios of weights, as applied here, are the most commonly used form of weight restrictions
in the literature. However, other types of weight restrictions could, of course, also have
been considered, like restrictions on virtual inputs or outputs, cf. Wong and Beasley
(1990). These determine the allowed fraction (or importance) of one input (output),
relative to the total value of the inputs (outputs). Thus rather than restricting e.g. the
weight on property loans relative to the weight on non-property loans in the asset mix
model, they would restrict the importance of property loans in the overall asset portfolio.
In the following subsection we specify how these relative weight restrictions, defined
from average weights across the fully-dimensional efficient facets, are incorporated into
the previous multiplier DEA model (1).
3.2 DEA models with weight restrictions
Let N e be the set of banks that are fully efficient in the unrestricted DEA models above,
i.e. with ej0.t0 = 1 in model (1). Thus let N
e = {(xj.t,yj.t) ∈ N |ej.t = 1}. We are now in-
terested in computing the average weights, but since the optimal weights for the efficient
banks in N e are generally not unique, we instead calculate the average weights across all
the fully-dimensional efficient facets spanned by the efficient banks (see e.g. Olesen and
Petersen, 2003). Considering the efficient facets, rather than the efficient banks, ensures
that the weights for each are uniquely determined. And only including fully-dimensional
facets means excluding facets for which the weights on one or more variables are equal
to zero. So these facets will each have a unique set of non-zero weights that are optimal
for all of the banks spanning, or belonging to, that facet.
In practice, the facets of the efficient frontier can be identified using the QHull soft-
ware, which also provides information about which observations span each facet and the
corresponding weights. Denote the set of fully-dimensional efficient facets by F and let
vkh and u
l
h denote the input- and output weights respectively, on the h’th facet. Since
we in the empirical application only apply weight restrictions limiting the range of the
weight on one input relative to the weight on another input, we in the following only
define weight restrictions for pairs of inputs, but note that the approach is easily gen-
eralized to weights on pairs of outputs or on an input weight relative to an output weight.
The average weight for an input variable k, across the set of fully-dimensional efficient
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facets, is calculated as
v¯k =
∑
h∈F
vkh/|F | (2)
where |F | denotes the cardinality of F. The corresponding sample standard deviation
around the sample mean is denoted by σv¯k .
Now we can calculate the ratio of the average weights for two inputs k′ and k′′ and
formulate weight restrictions requiring the ratio of allowable weights for k′ and k′′ to be
within the ratios of the average weight plus/minus 0.5 standard deviations as follows:
WR(k′, k′′) =
v¯k
′ − 0.5σv¯k′
v¯k′′ + 0.5σv¯k′′
≤ v
k′
vk′′
≤ v¯
k′ + 0.5σv¯k′
v¯k′′ − 0.5σv¯k′′
(3)
For the pairs of (here) inputs for which relative restrictions are desired, the cor-
responding ranges of allowable weights are defined from equation (3), linearised, and
simply added as constraints to the DEA multiplier model (1). Note that we, in a few
cases where an average weight minus 0.5 standard deviations becomes negative, replace
the value with a small positive number. Furthermore, while the choice of ± 0.5 standard
deviations as the range for the weight restrictions is quite arbitrary, we have as a ro-
bustness check experimented with different widths of these ranges, c.f. section 5.4., and
found that the overall results and conclusions in terms of patterns are not sensitive to
this choice. Finally, while we here use a simple average of the weights (multipliers) across
the facets, one might also consider to use a weighted average where the multipliers for
a facet are weighted by, for example, the size of the facet or the number of (inefficient)
observations projecting onto that facet.
Adding the weight restrictions means that some previously efficient banks are now
deemed inefficient because the weights that made them appear efficient are no longer
permissible.
Instead of determining the weight restrictions based on the average weights across
the fully-dimensional efficient facets, on might also consider defining the restrictions
from the weights for the average observation in the data set (see e.g. Kuosmanen et al.,
2010). Therefore we in this paper also consider the results from models where the weight
restrictions are based on the optimal weights for the average bank, i.e. the v∗ ∈ Rr+ and
u∗ ∈ Rs+ solving
min
r∑
k=1
vk
 2009∑
t=2006
n∑
j=1
xkj.t/4n

s.t.
s∑
l=1
ul
 2009∑
t=2006
n∑
j=1
ylj.t/4n
 ≥ 1, (4)
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r∑
k=1
vk
 2009∑
t=2006
n∑
j=1
xkj.t/4n
− s∑
l=1
ul
 2009∑
t=2006
n∑
j=1
ylj.t/4n
 ≥ 0,
r∑
k=1
vkxkj.t −
s∑
l=1
ulylj.t ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , n, t = 2006, . . . , 2009
vk, ul ≥ 0, k = 1, . . . , r, l = 1, . . . , s.
Using the average observation does not, in theory, guarantee all non-zero weights nor
a unique set of weights, though both are highly likely since the average observation, being
located “in the middle of the data set”, is likely to project onto a fully-dimensional effi-
cient facet. Note also that if using the average observation to define weight restrictions,
those are likely to have a larger impact on the group of observations located furthest
away from this point. Whether this is the case here will be investigated empirically in
section 5.4 below.
4 Data
The data used to analyse the risk and efficiency of the European banks includes annual
observations (2006, . . . ,2009) from 71 European banks head-quartered in 20 different
member states. This sample of banks, with total assets of EUR 27,021 billion at the
end of 2009, represents approximately 63% of the total assets of the EU-27 banking
system. All data are collected directly from each bank’s audited financial reports. All
data are adjusted for inflation using the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices compiled
by Eurostat.
4.1 Sample selection
The selection of the sample follows the principle used by the 2010 EU-wide stress test
exercise conducted by the Committee for European Banking Supervisors (CEBS)4 for its
selection of the sample banks. The CEBS sample is designed to be representative enough
to provide a good proxy of the overall resilience of the EU banking sector. The scope
includes the major EU cross-border banking groups and a group of additional, mostly
large, credit institutions in Europe. In each EU member state, the sample has been con-
structed by including banks, in descending order of size, so as to cover at least 50% of the
national banking sector, expressed in terms of total assets. Once the market share, in
terms of total assets, reached 50% no other banks were included from that member state,
unless it voluntarily wished to include additional banks. Two special cases are Germany
and Spain. In Germany, the public banking sector, dominated by 7 Landesbanken, faced
severe financial difficulties during the crisis. Consequently 14 banks, including both the
largest commercial banks and the publicly owned Landesbanken, have been included,
representing more than 50% of the market share in the German banking system in terms
4Detailed information about the EU-wide stress test is available at http://www.c-
ebs.org/EuWideStressTesting.aspx
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of total assets. In Spain 27 banks were included, representing around 95% of the Spanish
banking system in terms of total assets, amongst which 25 were domestic savings banks
(CAJAs) representing around 40% of the assets in the Spanish banking system. These
savings banks also faced severe financial difficulties during the crisis. As a result the
EU-wide stress test includes 91 banks in total.
In this study, for the sake of consistency and comparability, banks are included in
descending order of size to cover at least 50% of the national banking sector in terms
of total assets. We divide the banks into two groups, of those that were bailed out
by their respective governments during the crisis and those that were not, according
to the state aid they received during the crisis: The banks that received substantial
government support during the crisis and were required to undergo far-reaching restruc-
turing to return to viability (bailed-out banks), and banks that may have had access
to government support through national-level general schemes (such as a central bank
liquidity facility or state guarantee) but were not required to undergo restructuring (non-
bailed-out banks). During the crisis, the EU member states intervened on a large scale
to rescue failing financial institutions. In order to ensure that the rescue measures in
each member state could attain the objectives of financial stability and maintenance of
credit flows, whilst still ensuring a level playing field between banks located in different
member states as well as between banks which received public support and those which
did not, avoiding harmful subsidy races, limiting moral hazard and ensuring the com-
petitiveness and efficiency of European banks, the European Commission intervened to
control the aid granted by each of the member states. Five successive communications
providing guidance on the design and implementation of state aid in favour of banks
were issued between October 2008 and July 2009. The guidance relates to two types
of aid: 1) General schemes to aid all banks, and 2) Ad hoc interventions in support of
a particular bank. Detailed information on the general guidance and on specific cases
are available from the European Commission’s website and the European Commission’s
state aid register.
In our sample, there are 23 banks that received significant amounts of aid (in the
form of capital injections, toxic asset relief measures and state guarantees) approved
by the European Commission on an individual basis (type 2 above). These banks are
considered by the national authorities and/or the European Commission as financially
distressed banks which require far-reaching restructuring over the next few years to re-
store viability. Some of these banks were not included in the EU-wide stress test but are
included in our study. Moreover, our sample includes 5 Spanish savings banks (which
now belong to 3 savings bank groups following mergers and restructuring of the Spanish
savings banking industry) which failed the EU wide stress test in 2010. Detailed data
for the other 2 savings groups that also failed the stress test were not available. Finally,
the Greek bank ATE is included since it also failed the EU wide stress test in 2010.
The rest of the banks are considered by the national authorities and/or the European
Commission to be internally efficient and sound, but adversely affected by the extreme
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market conditions during the crisis. They still had access to government support through
general schemes open to all banks (type 1 above), but these banks were expected to be
able to return to viability with the general-scheme support and without far-reaching
restructuring. The total number of banks included in our sample is 71, of which 29 are
classified as bailed-out, having received significant amounts of aid and/or failed the EU
stress test whereas the remaining 42 banks are classified as non-bailed-out, c.f. the last
column in Table 1 below.
It is worth noting that the EU banks have been selected on a group-wide basis. This
means that subsidiaries and branches of a cross-border operating bank are included
as part of its consolidated group in the sample. As such, all EU Member States are
covered and the banks in the sample are head-quartered in 20 EU Member States. In
the remaining 7 EU member states, more than 50% of the local market was already
covered by foreign banks. The list of banks included in this study, with their market
shares (in terms of total assets) in the EU-27 banking system, is shown in the Appendix.
4.2 Differences between bailed-out and non-bailed-out banks
The concerns about funding- and asset-portfolio risks emerging from the recent crisis, as
discussed in the introduction and literature review, are supported by the data collected
for this paper, as evidenced by the results from some preliminary analysis presented in
the following.
Table 1 below shows the differences in funding structures and asset portfolios between
bailed-out and non-bailed-out banks. In Table 1, wholesale funding includes inter-bank
lending, debt securities issued and subordinated debt; total funding includes retail fund-
ing (deposit from individuals and firms) and wholesale funding. Property loans include
loans to the real estate sector not including residential mortgages. Trading financial as-
sets are assets traded on banks’ own accounts; total financial assets include trading and
non-trading assets (available-for-sale assets, held-to-maturity assets and other financial
assets). Subsection 4.3 below provides further details about the variable definitions.
Table 1 shows the mean values of different types of funding, loans and financial assets
of each group. In terms of funding structure (measured by wholesale funding/wholesale
and retail funding), the bailed-out banks (B) rely significantly more on wholesale funding
than banks that were not bailed out (NB)5.
In terms of the loan portfolio (indicated by property loans/property and non-property
loans to non-bank customers), group B has a significantly higher proportion of property
loans than group NB. In terms of trading assets (measured by the ratio of trading fi-
nancial assets/trading and non-trading financial assets), the size of the trading portfolio
of group B is, on average, (weakly) significantly smaller than that of group NB. It is
5The comparisons of sample means in both Table 1 and Table 2 are done using t-test, without
assuming equal variances (as in some cases the variance in one of the groups is twice as large as that in
the other).
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Table 1: Mean comparisons of funding structure, and loan and financial asset portfolio
between bailed-out (B) and non-bailed-out (NB) banks
Year 2006 Year 2007 Year 2008 Year 2009
B NB B NB B NB B NB
No. of Obs. 29 42 30 42 29 43 29 42
Wholesale funding/Total Fund-
ing (%)
52.9 42.2 53.4 42.9 49.7 41.1 49.0 40.9
T-test (HA: Difference 6= 0) 2.14 (0.0366) 2.16 (0.0350) 1.83 (0.0726) 1.77 (0.0831)
Property loans/Total loans to
non-bank customers (%)
16.9 9.6 18.1 10.1 16.6 10.5 16.2 10.2
T-test (HA: Difference 6= 0) 2.03 (0.0501) 2.29 (0.0279) 2.50 (0.0164) 2.37 (0.0226)
Trading financial assets/Total
financial assets (%)
32.5 44.8 31.2 44.1 34.0 46.6 29.0 40.8
T-test (HA: Difference 6= 0) -1.76 (0.0833) -1.91 (0.0611) -1.70 (0.0937) -1.75 (0.0843)
a. Data sources: Banks’ audited financial statements.
b. The sample differs slightly from year to year due to data constraints and restructuring of some banks.
c. T-statistics and p-values from mean comparison tests are reported.
possible that banks in group B are less able to diversify risk with their relatively smaller
trading portfolios.
The patterns seen in Table 1 suggest that banks with different funding structures and
asset portfolios may exhibit different levels of risk. Using extreme funding and/or asset
mixes may expose banks to higher risks, and the potentially inappropriate mixes are in
turn revealed by the weights assigned to a bank’s inputs and outputs in the efficiency
measurement models, where low weights would be put on e.g. an input they use a lot
of, thereby implicitly underestimating its cost - including risk. Inspired by the above
observations, we incorporate such risks into the measurement of bank efficiency by use
of the weight restrictions defined in section 3.2., specifically for the relative weights on
pairs of inputs, in accordance with the findings in Table 1.
4.3 Model specifications and variables
In the empirical analysis we consider the funding portfolio (mix) and the asset portfolio
(mix) separately in two different DEA models, modelling the transformation from fund-
ing (and other inputs) to assets and from assets (including loans) to income respectively.
The aim is to better understand risks arising from inappropriate funding mixes vis-a-vis
asset mixes. When assessing the efficiency related to the funding mix, we adopt an
intermediation approach where banks are perceived as entities that transform deposit
and funding into loans and financial assets. Under this specification, the input variables
include retail funding expenses, wholesale funding expenses, physical capital expenses
and personnel expenses. On the output side, we include loans and financial assets. We
also include impaired loan on the input side as discussed below. A list of all variables
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used in the funding- and asset-mix models is provided in the appendix.
To analyze the risk and efficiency related to asset mixes (i.e. different types of loans
and financial assets), we specify a model where banks are viewed as transforming vari-
ous loans (including property and non-property loans) and financial assets (trading and
non-trading financial assets) into income. We also include impaired loans on the asset
side and provision for impaired loan loss on the income side, also discussed below, as a
way of directly controlling for risks associated specifically with the quality of the loan
portfolio. Under this specification, prices are assumed to be endogenous. In particular,
we assume that the pricing of certain loans and assets are, or should be, related to their
underlying risks. Therefore higher risk taking should be compensated for by a higher
income, in order for a bank to be deemed efficient.
Our approach of applying both a funding mix model and an asset mix model also pro-
vides insight into banks’ performance both on the operation side and on the profitability
side as has been emphasized in earlier studies (e.g. Seiford and Zhu, 1999; Soteriou and
Zenios, 1999). The contribution of our study is that we control for the risk arising from
the funding mix and the asset mix respectively when assessing the performance related
to banks’ operation and profitability.
The definition of each of the variables included in the models is as follows: Retail
funding refers to deposits received from the retail funding market, i.e. deposits from
individuals and firms. Wholesale funding refers to funding obtained from the wholesale
funding market, including inter-bank market funding, debt securities issued by the bank,
and subordinated debt of the bank. We differentiate retail funding from wholesale fund-
ing to explicitly consider the varying reliance on the wholesale funding market by the
studied banks evident from Table 1.
All loans are net loans after banks’ provisions for impairment losses. Property loans
are distinguished from other loans since the decline of the property market during the
crisis led to significant losses from bad loans in this part of many banks’ loan portfolios.
Trading financial assets are debt securities and equity securities acquired principally for
the purpose of trading in the near term as well as positive fair values of trading deriva-
tives. These assets are held by the banks for trading on their own account (the so-called
proprietary trading). On the one hand, excessive holding of trading assets by banks
may expose them to market volatility, especially under extreme market conditions. On
the other hand, the trading portfolio may have to be of a relatively substantial size to
be able to achieve the effect of risk diversification. During the recent crisis, some dis-
tressed banks suffered from high trading losses. Therefore we, in this study, distinguish
trading assets from other types of financial assets. Other financial assets, used as one of
the asset measures, include available-for-sale financial assets, held-to-maturity financial
assets and other financial assets. Available-for-sale financial assets include equity and
debt securities which are not held for trading in the near term. They are held for an in-
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definite period of time and may be sold in response to needs for liquidity or in response
to changes in market conditions. Held-to-maturity financial assets are non-derivative
assets with fixed or determinable payments and fixed maturities and the bank has the
intention and ability to hold them until maturity.
The income variable is generated as the sum of net interest income, net commission
income, net trading income and all other operating income.
As mentioned previously, to ensure that the risk elements reflected in the banks’
funding and investment portfolio model are taken into account when measuring banks’
efficiency, we make the above distinctions regarding a bank’s funding, loans and financial
assets. In addition to accounting for extreme judgements of the risks associated with
different funding sources or/and assets, another important aspect that reflects a bank’s
risk strategy is the quality of the assets. In the literature, there are different approaches
for introducing the quality of loans as an element of risk into a DEA model. For in-
stance, Hughes and Mester (1993) add non-performing loans as a quality measure for
total outputs taking account of risk. Charnes et al. (1990) instead considers loan loss
provision as an additional input together with accumulated loan losses.
In this study, we include impaired loan as an input and provision for impaired loan
loss as an output in our asset mix model, and use the impaired loans as an input in our
funding mix model. There are several advantages of adopting this approach: Firstly, by
introducing impaired loans on the input side, banks with bad management of problem
loans who would otherwise achieve higher short term efficiency by accumulating problem
loans are appropriately penalised. Secondly, by introducing provision for impaired loan
loss on the output side, banks with a prudent perception of the losses from the impaired
loans are appropriately rewarded. It is worth noting that the provision for impaired
loan loss indicates banks’ risk perception, not only based on past loss experience but
also based on predictions of future risk conditions. This point is particularly important
in the context of the global crisis. The relevant issue is whether banks are allowing ade-
quate losses arising from the impaired loans. As shown in Table 2, in spite of the sharp
increase in both impaired loans and provision for loan impairment loss during the crisis,
the ratio of loan loss provision over total impaired loans is decreasing for both bailed-out
and non-bailed-out banks, i.e. the increase in impaired loans is greater than the increase
in loan loss provision. While we can not conclude from Table 2 whether banks are mak-
ing adequate provision for impairment losses corresponding to the increasing amounts of
impaired loans, the mean comparison tests in Table 2 show that non-bailed-out banks
have significantly higher loan loss provisions than bailed-out banks given the amount
of impaired loans. For the above reasons, we believe it is important to introduce both
impaired loans and provision for loan impairment losses into our DEA models. Consid-
ering that provision for impaired loan loss directly affects banks’ income or profit, and to
avoid double counting, we adopt this approach of impaired loans as input and provision
for impaired loan loss on the output side in our asset mix model. In the funding mix
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model, we only include impaired loans on the input side to control for loan quality. The
detailed definition of impaired loans and provision for impaired loan loss is given below.
Impaired loans are defined under the International Accounting Standard (IAS 39).
A financial asset or a group of financial assets is impaired and impairment losses are
incurred if, and only if, there is objective evidence of impairment as a result of one or
more loss events. Thus, unlike non-performing loans whose definition can be different
from bank to bank, the above defined impaired loan gives consistent definition of loan
quality across different banks. According to the IAS, if there is objective evidence that
an impairment loss on financial assets has occurred, the amount of loss is measured as
the difference between the asset’s carrying amount and the present value of estimated
future cash flows6. The carrying amount of the asset is then reduced by the amount of
loss (either directly or through use of an allowance account7). Although the IAS sets
certain standards for the estimation of future cash flows to measure impairment loss, this
estimation involved in impairment loss allowance/provision of a bank inevitably reflects
a bank’s value judgement and risk perception regarding how much impairment loss to set
aside out of the impaired assets. Although the methodology and assumptions used for
estimating future cash flows may be reviewed, there might be a lag in the adjustment in
the difference between loss estimates and actual loss experience. Therefore the provision
for loan impairment loss can be perceived as a measurement of how much loss a bank
sets aside as risk insurance. In other words, given the amount of impaired loan, the
provision for the impairment loss should reflect a bank’s perception of the cost of the
risks associated with the impaired assets.
The above procedure of including impaired loans and loan loss provision resembles
the approach applied in Brockett et al. (1997). They also used the provisional loan
loss as an output regarding it as “provision for risk insurance”, but treated the amount
of impairment loss charged for the concerned accounting year as an input. Since the
amount of impairment loss charged for the concerned accounting year is based on the
provisional loan loss (at the balance sheet date) on the output side, it also reflects banks’
risk perception. It runs the risk of penalising banks of charging high impairment loss
each year due to prudential perception of risk. However using impaired loan on the
input side addresses this problem since, as mentioned above, it is the objective evidence
of loan losses without reflecting banks’ risk perception.
In addition, considering that the impaired loans are not a real input in a bank’s
intermediation production plan and that the incorporation of this variable is primarily
to control for loan quality of banks, we do not apply weight restrictions relating to this
input variable. The weight restrictions are primarily used to adjust bank risk arising
from extreme mixes of, or judgements of the risks of, loans and assets instead of the
6By definition it is possible for accumulated losses over time to exceed the asset’s carrying amount.
7Meanwhile, the amount of loss incurred for the concerned accounting year is reflected in the profit
or loss.
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quality of the loans.
Table 2: Mean comparisons of impaired loans, provision for loan impairment loss and
provision for loan impairment loss/impaired loan between bailed-out (B) and non-bailed-
out banks (NB)
Bailed-out (B) Non-bailed-out (NB)
Year
2006
Year
2007
Year
2008
Year
2009
Year
2006
Year
2007
Year
2008
Year
2009
No. of Obs. 29 30 29 29 42 42 43 42
Impaired loans (Euro m) 3196.4 3196.6 5538.7 10266.6 3463.9 4043.9 5270.0 8241.6
Overall 5529.5 5248.2
T-test (HA: Difference 6= 0) 0.13 (0.9004)
Provision for loan impairment loss
(Euro m)
1711.1 1664.3 2597.6 4596.5 2643.5 3124.4 3915.4 5455.4
Overall 2634.0 3785.5
T-test (HA: Difference 6= 0) -2.26 (0.0249)
Provision for loan impairment
loss/impaired loans(%)
75.7 74.4 57.5 49.4 95.5 81.4 66.1 60.6
Overall 64.4 75.9
T-test (HA: Difference 6= 0) -1.89 (0.0588)
5 Results
In this section, we first present the results of an efficiency analysis using pooled data
(across all four years, 2006-2009) with and without weight restrictions. The decreases in
the banks’ efficiency scores caused by the introduction of weight restrictions are consid-
ered to be indicators of the banks’ underlying risk, and the average decreases for bailed
and non-bailed-out banks are compared. Our pooled analysis show that the imposition
of weight restrictions have significantly different impacts on the bailed than on the non-
bailed-out banks.
Since one might challenge the appropriateness of using a pooled frontier in the ef-
ficiency analysis, especially during such a turbulent time period, where the frontier is
likely to be unstable, we next perform similar analysis within each of the four years
separately. This serves both as a robustness check for the results from the pooled anal-
ysis, but also enables us to investigate whether banks with higher decrease in weight
restricted scores (indicating higher risk) before the onset of the crisis (specifically in
2006) are more likely to be the banks ending in more serious trouble during the actual
crisis and thus subsequently requiring bail-out. Therefore, a comparison of the decrease
from weight restrictions in 2006, between the subsequently bailed and non-bailed banks
is of particular interest.
Finally, we identify a set of consistently reasonably efficient banks in the weight re-
stricted models, which we consider to be relevant role model for supervision of bank
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capital requirements.
5.1 Pooled analysis of efficiency scores with and without weight re-
strictions
Table 3 below presents the average unrestricted DEA scores for the (117) bailed-out
and the (169) non-bailed out banks, in both the funding- and the asset-mix model. In
the next row are shown the corresponding average scores where the weight restrictions
defined in section 3.2 have been applied on all inputs relative to the first input (retail
funding in the funding mix model and property loan in the asset mix model), excluding
however restrictions on impaired loans, as explained in section 4.3.
We then show the average decrease in the efficiency scores resulting from the ap-
plication of the weight restrictions defined from the average weights (by design, the
weight restricted scores can only decrease compared to the unrestricted scores). Next
we compare the decrease in efficiency scores between bailed-out banks and non-bailed-
out banks, expecting that bailed-out banks (which arguably are more extreme in their
risk judgement leading to their known failures) are likely to be more affected by the
weight restrictions, due to their extreme choices of portfolio mixes and corresponding
risk judgements. We do, however, recognise that some non-bailed-out banks may have
been lucky to get away with only receiving general rather than individual aid, but may
still be intrinsically unsound. Therefore we may not necessarily observe a distinctive
contrast between bailed and non-bailed-out banks in all the results.
Table 3: Unrestricted and weight restricted (WR) efficiency scores (%) for bailed (B)
and non-bailed (NB) banks: Pooled analysis
Funding mix Asset mix
B NB B NB
No. of banks 117 169 117 169
Unrestricted scores 66.4 67.2 39.7 63.4
WR scores 61.7 62.8 31.0 59.0
Decrease in scores 6.8 5.5 17.7 6.9
(% of unrestricted scores)
MW test z-statistics 2.68 6.15
(p-values) (0.0075) (0.0000)
In Table 3 we see that the average unrestricted efficiency scores for the bailed-out and
the non-bailed-out banks are very similar in the funding mix model, whereas the non-
bailed-out banks have significantly larger efficiency scores than the bailed-out banks in
the asset mix model. This pattern remains when looking at the weight restricted scores.
But looking finally at the decrease in efficiency scores resulting from the imposition of
weight restrictions, it is interesting to observe that the decrease in scores is largest for
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the bailed-out banks. That this difference between the groups, in terms of the decrease
in scores from the weight restrictions, is significant is confirmed by (non-parametric)
Mann-Whitney tests, the results of which are shown in the last row of Table 3. So
it seems that the bailed-out banks are more affected by the imposition of the weight
restrictions limiting their abilities to use extreme weights (risk judgements), than non-
bailed-out banks are.
Table 4 below shows the banks with the largest decreases in efficiency scores caused
by the introduction of weight restrictions, determined as those banks with decreases
above the 50th or 75th percentile, for both the funding mix model and the asset mix
model.
Table 4: Proportion of bailed-out (B) banks amongst the banks with the largest decreases
in efficiency scores after weight restrictions: Pooled analysis
Year Decrease in scores above Decrease in scores above Total sample
the threshold of 50th percentile the threshold of 75th percentile
No.
of B
banks
No. of B
and NB
banks
% of B
banks
No.
of B
banks
No. of B
and NB
banks
% of B
banks
No. of
B
No. of B
and NB
banks
% of B
banks
Funding mix 69 136 50.7 30 63 47.6 117 286 40.9
Asset mix 78 138 56.5 45 68 66.2 117 286 40.9
From Table 4 we see, that whilst the bailed-out banks constitute around 41 % of the
total sample of banks, there are around 50% bailed banks amongst those with a decrease
above the 50th percentile and 48% bailed banks amongst those with a decrease above the
75th percentile in the funding mix model. With regard to the asset mix model, we find
an even clearer overrepresentation of bailed-out banks amongst the banks experiencing
the largest decreases in efficiency scores. As an example to illustrate this, the British
bank HBOS, which was later acquired by Lloyds Banking Group, failed disastrously
during the crisis8. One of the reasons for the failure was that it had very aggressive
lending portfolios. However, this bank is considered efficient by the unrestricted asset
mix model. But the application of weight restrictions lowered the efficiency scores mas-
sively from 100% to nearly 0% in 2008 when the crisis hit. Thus besides on average
having larger absolute decreases in efficiency scores following the weight restrictions, the
bailed-out banks are also overrepresented amongst the banks with the largest decreases.
Therefore it is clear that the bailed-out banks are more severely affected by the impo-
sition of weight restrictions limiting their ability to use extreme judgements of risks in
their efficiency assessments.
8See European Commission state aid case No. N428/2009
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5.2 Annual analysis of efficiency scores with and without weight re-
strictions
The pooled analysis above strongly suggests that weight restrictions affect the bailed-
out banks more than the non-bailed-out banks. It is therefore interesting to see whether
this pattern is consistent if the analysis is done within each of the years separately, and
furthermore whether there is a relationship between the impact of weight restrictions
(indicating extreme and thus risky mixes) before the crisis and the subsequent need for
bail-out during the crisis. In 2006, the year just before the hit of the crisis, risky and
opportunistic behaviour among banks related to funding and asset exposure is expected
to be at a relatively high level. In 2007, the situation is perhaps less clear-cut and it is
difficult to predict how different banks’ behaviour is likely to be: some banks may still
be pursuing highly risky behaviour although the crisis started to hit a small number
of banks such as Northern Rock. It is, however, also possible that certain banks may
have started to react to changing market conditions in 2007. The bankruptcy of Lehman
Brothers in September 2008 which then hit many other banks in the global financial mar-
ket perhaps symbolise the height of the crisis. In 2009, more European banks required
extensive government aid. Therefore, in 2008 and 2009 one could reasonably expect that
the crisis would have hit all banks, resulting in less dissimilar and extreme behaviour
amongst the banks as a whole. This would perhaps imply less distinctive impact between
bailed and non-bailed-out banks arising from weight restrictions. To understand this,
we present the result of annual analysis using weight restrictions to see how the impact
of weight restrictions differ between bailed and non-bailed-out banks within each of the
years 2006-2009.
Unlike pooled analysis that uses one common frontier, the annual analysis uses a sep-
arate frontier in each year, which take into consideration the changes in the production
possibilities for the financial markets the banks operate in, from 2006 and through the
crisis period 2008-2009. This also means that in the annual analysis, we use a different
set of weight restrictions in each year.
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Table 5: Unrestricted and weight restricted (WR) efficiency scores (%) for bailed (B)
and non-bailed (NB) banks: Annual analysis
Funding mix
2006 2007 2008 2009
B NB B NB B NB B NB
Unrestricted scores 86.2 87.1 76.2 83.5 84.8 86.0 78.4 74.4
MW test z-statistics -0.44 -1.54 0.27 1.26
(p-values) (0.6581) (0.1233) (0.7854) (0.2036)
WR scores 73.3 83.6 70.3 75.5 78.8 82.5 72.7 69.9
MW test z-statistics -2.36 -1.28 -0.62 0.84
(p-values) (0.0182) (0.2024) (0.5379) (0.3992)
Decrease in scores 15.8 4.0 9.7 9.6 7.1 4.2 7.6 5.6
(% of unrestricted scores)
MW test z-statistics 4.48 -0.16 0.96 0.77
(p-values) (0.0000) (0.8723) (0.3363) (0.4429)
Asset mix
2006 2007 2008 2009
B NB B NB B NB B NB
Unrestricted scores 59.0 86.1 57.6 82.2 40.4 74.1 50.2 79.5
MW test z-statistics -3.75 -3.14 -4.26 -4.31
(p-values) (0.0002) (0.0017) (0.0000) (0.0000)
WR scores 44.7 78.9 40.5 74.7 17.6 49.9 39.7 72.3
MW test z-statistics -4.95 -5.12 -5.25 -5.02
(p-values) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Decrease in scores 21.9 8.4 25.0 9.4 43.5 31.7 18.9 8.8
(% of unrestricted scores)
MW test z-statistics 4.09 3.23 1.6 2.25
(p-values) (0.0000) (0.0012) (0.1092) (0.0242)
Table 6: Proportion of bailed-out (B) banks amongst banks with the largest decreases
in efficiency scores after weight restrictions: Annual Analysis
Year Decrease in scores above Decrease in scores above Total sample
the threshold of 50th percentile the threshold of 75th percentile
No.
of B
banks
No. of B
and NB
banks
% of B
banks
No.
of B
banks
No. of B
and NB
banks
% of B
banks
No. of
B
No. of B
and NB
banks
% of B
banks
Funding mix model
2006 23 36 63.9 13 17 76.5 29 71 40.8
2007 14 35 40.0 6 17 35.3 30 72 41.7
2008 15 36 41.7 11 17 64.7 29 72 40.3
2009 16 36 44.4 10 17 58.8 29 71 40.8
Asset mix model
2006 23 37 62.2 10 15 66.7 29 71 40.8
2007 20 37 54.1 13 17 76.5 30 72 41.7
2008 20 36 55.6 9 18 50.0 29 72 40.3
2009 16 35 45.7 13 18 72.2 29 71 40.8
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The results in Table 5 strongly suggest that in 2006, the drop in weight restricted
scores is significantly larger for bailed-out than non-bailed-out banks. This implies that
banks with large decreases in weight restricted scores in the year prior to the crisis are
more likely to be those which ended up in serious trouble and needed ad hoc govern-
ment aid during the crisis years. Results from Table 6 confirms that in 2006, among the
banks with the largest drops in weight restricted scores (above 50th and 75th percentile),
the bailed-out banks are overrepresented compared to the sample distribution. However,
and perhaps not surprisingly, the difference between non-bailed-out and bailed-out banks
from imposing weight restrictions is not so clear after 2006. As mentioned earlier, this is
possibly due to banks becoming less dissimilar or extreme once the crisis hit the whole
market where banks are interconnected. Therefore weight restrictions are perhaps more
important for periods during which extreme behaviour among some banks is likely.
It is worth noting that in the asset mix model, non-bailed-out banks are significantly
more efficient than bailed out banks in each year even without any weight restrictions.
This may be due to the design of our asset mix model where (as mentioned earlier)
asset price is endogenous and higher risk taking should be compensated for by a higher
income, in order for a bank to be deemed efficient. But even in this model, the results in
Table 5 and 6 show that weight restrictions still has a larger impact on bailed-out than
on non-bailed-out banks.
5.3 Identifying model banks using weight restricted models
5.3.1 Motivation
Firstly we motivate the exercise of identifying model banks before explaining how our
suggested approach contributes in this respect.
The Financial Services Authority9, the financial regulator of the UK, conducted
socalled hypothetical portfolio exercises in 2007, 2009 and 2011. These experimental
exercises take a set of common portfolios and ask how much capital banks’ internal
models would set against them. The results from these exercises show large differences
between banks regarding their judgement of the probabilities of default of the three as-
set portfolios and associated risk weights. The estimated capital requirements for the
most prudent banks were well over three times as high as those of the most aggressive
banks for the same portfolios of exposures10. Similar tests have also been conducted by
the Basel Committee focusing on international banks’ trading books (BIS, 2013) and
show large variations between banks regarding their judgement of risk weights of various
9FSA has now become two authorities: The Financial Conduct Authority can be found at
www.fca.org.uk and the Prudential Regulation Authority at www.bankofengland.co.uk.
10Regarding detailed methods and results of the policy experiments, see FSA (2007) (2010); financial
stability report by bank of England 2012, chart 3.18 and 3.19, Bank of England (2012); and the speech
by Andrew Haldane, the Executive Director of Financial Stability at Bank of England, Haldane (2013).
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classes of assets. Since the hypothetical portfolio is the same for all participating banks,
the heterogeneity is not due to differences in underlying (actual) risk which would have
been indicated by different mixes of assets given the risk judgement of various types of
assets in the portfolio. The heterogeneity is judgement-based arising from different bank
practices in both experiments. To further explain the heterogeneity, BIS (2013) shows
various sources of differences in practice including for instance, differences in banks’
modelling choices (data, methodology, definition of default, adjustment for cyclical ef-
fects etc), differences in interpretation of regulatory frameworks, or discretion permitted
under the regulatory capital framework etc. This kind of heterogeneity is undesirable
if it produces material differences that undermine risk regulation and supervision of
banks. One policy option, mentioned in BIS (2013), is to determine additional supervi-
sory benchmarks for the risk parameters used to assess capital ratios and risk weighted
assets (the inferred denominator of regulatory capital ratios). These benchmarks might
include representative probabilities of default (PD) estimates for particular rating grades
or for other indicators of credit quality, representative loss given default (LGD) estimates
for various types of exposures, etc.
It is in the determination of these additional supervisory benchmarks that our sug-
gested approach can potentially make an additional contribution. The weights inferred
from each bank’s input-output portfolio reflect the bank’s optimal judgement (in terms
of maximizing efficiency) of the risk-adjusted prices of the funding/asset portfolio, that
is the risk associated with each variable relative to its cost/return. Since the ‘true’
risk levels are unknown, allowing only a range of (relative) weights around the average
weights means harmonising the heterogeneous risk judgements. Those banks that re-
main efficient after the imposition of weight restrictions can then be selected as model
banks. After selecting model banks, we suggest that the internal estimates (such as
PD, LGD etc.) of these model banks, as estimated by the banks themselves using their
internal models and data sets, can be used as reference points to constrain the discretion
in the choice of risk estimates. This will then constrain the discretion in the capital ra-
tios derived from these risk estimates, thus improving the effectiveness of the regulatory
capital benchmarks. Using these constrained risk estimates, banks will have to provide
a strong capital base if they choose an exposure that has high underlying risk based on
the reference risk estimates.
5.3.2 Results on model banks
Having applied weight restrictions to harmonise banks’ risk judgement, we now select
a set of model banks who consistently, that is across all four years of the study, are
amongst the most efficient banks. Applying a threshold of 50th percentile (i.e. banks
with restricted scores over the 50th percentile consistently for all four years) using the
pooled analysis, results in identifying 3 bailed-out and 9 non-bailed-out banks from the
funding mix model (see appendix) and 1 bailed-out and 17 non-bailed-out banks from
the asset mix model (see appendix). If we combine the two models, only four banks, that
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are all non-bailed-out, are consistently amongst the best performers in both models, and
thus constitute a sensible set of potential reference (or model) banks. These four banks
are: BNP, DEUTSCHE, HSBC and OP. It is worth noting that the results demonstrate
that it is important to assess both the funding and asset model under our approach when
evaluating a bank’s efficiency. To illustrate this using an example: Northern Rock (NR)
which failed badly during the crisis partly due to its risky funding model (heavily reliant
on wholesale funding11) has its weight restricted efficiency score in the asset mix model
at around 100% but its weight restricted scores in the funding mix model are very low
and at their lowest in 2007 (it was hit by the crisis during September 2007) and 2008 at
around 5%. This is not to claim that the case of Northern Rock was solely a problem
of over-reliance on wholesale funding, nor do we claim that the problem of other major
banks in Europe is solely due to over-reliance on property loans. It is inevitable that
a problem on the liability side will eventually be reflected on the asset side and vice
versa due to the nature of banking activities which include transforming illiquid assets
into liquid liabilities. No implication is meant to be drawn from the model or results
regarding whether unbalanced funding or assets is more fundamental to the failure of
certain banks. Whereas we here analyse the funding mix and the assets mix in two sep-
arate models, which allows us to understand how unbalanced funding and assets each
contribute to the inefficiency estimated with weight restrictions, an interesting idea for
future research could be to consider both mixes together, for example using a two-stage
model along the lines of Seiford and Zhu (1999), where in our case the first stage would
consider the transformation of funding into assets, and the next the transformation of
those assets into income.
Using annual analysis, we identify 1 bailed-out and 9 non-bailed-out banks from the
funding mix model and 1 bailed-out and 19 non-bailed-out banks from the asset mix
model. If we combine the two models, we identify 5 model banks: BCEE, DEUTSCHE,
HSBC, OP and UBI. The two sets of models banks identified by the pooled and by the
annual analysis respectively are largely consistent with each other except BCEE, BNP
and UBI which are borderline cases in each analysis12.
As discussed above, together with regulatory capital ratios, there is the need of super-
visory benchmarks to constrain the choice of risk estimates which are used to define and
calculate capital ratios. This is to constrain the discretion in the derivation of regulatory
capital ratios thus improving the effectiveness of these regulatory capital benchmarks.
Once model banks are identified, we propose that the internal risk estimates of the model
banks selected by our weight-restricted DEA models can be used as reference points to
determine the additional supervisory benchmarks for various risk estimates which are
used to define regulatory capital ratios. For instance, in choosing estimates for the PD
11see European Commission State aid case no. C 14/2008.
12To save space, we in the appendix only show the banks selected by the funding and the asset mix
model in the pooled analysis. The full set of results regarding all efficiency scores in all models are
available upon request.
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per rating grade, which gives the average percentage of obligors that default in this rating
grade in the course of one year, banks’ estimates can differ depending on the choice of
their internal estimation models and data. What we are proposing is that, among other
regulatory tools, the model banks selected by our weight restricted DEA models can be
used as reference points and their internal estimates can be referred to if regulators need
to benchmark such kind of risk estimates13.
5.4 Weight restrictions based on the average observation
As a robustness check we have also repeated all the previous analysis using weight re-
strictions based on the weights from the average observation (eq. 4), rather than from
the average of the weights (across the facets). Table 7 and 8 show the differences be-
tween the restricted and unrestricted efficiency scores in the pooled and annual analysis
respectively.
Table 7: Unrestricted and weight restricted (WR) efficiency scores (%) for bailed (B)
and non-bailed (NB) banks (based on average observation): Pooled analysis
Funding mix Asset mix
B NB B NB
No. of banks 117 169 117 169
Unrestricted scores 66.4 67.2 39.7 63.4
WR scores 54.1 57.7 32.9 57.8
Decrease in scores 17.8 12.9 11.7 7.5
(% of unrestricted scores)
MW test z-statistics 3.48 2.45
(p-values) (0.0005) (0.0142)
13It is important to note that we are not proposing to, for instance, replace the capital regulation
benchmark proposed by the Basel committee, or to use model banks as a set target for other banks.
Instead we are proposing to use our method to identify references for additional supervisory purposes for
e.g. capital regulation. The motivation is to reduce the discretion among banks in terms of appropriate
risk weights they can apply to different assets, resulting in a more effective use of capital ratio regulation.
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Table 8: Unrestricted and weight restricted (WR) efficiency scores (%) for bailed (B)
and non-bailed (NB) banks (based on average observation): Annual analysis
Funding mix
2006 2007 2008 2009
B NB B NB B NB B NB
Unrestricted scores 86.3 87.1 76.2 83.5 84.8 86.0 78.5 74.4
MW test z-statistics -0.44 -1.54 0.27 1.26
(p-values) (0.6581) (0.1233) (0.7854) (0.2036)
WR scores 71.6 78.8 74.9 81.9 82.6 85.3 75.5 72.4
MW test z-statistics -1.76 -1.51 -0.18 1.08
(p-values) (0.0781) (0.1319) (0.8578) (0.2804)
Decrease in scores 17.8 9.5 3.1 1.7 2.5 0.9 3.8 2.5
(% of unrestricted scores)
MW test z-statistics 2.72 1.68 1.09 0.74
(p-values) (0.0065) (0.0935) (0.2728) (0.4590)
Asset mix
2006 2007 2008 2009
B NB B NB B NB B NB
Unrestricted scores 59.0 86.1 57.6 82.2 40.4 74.1 50.2 79.5
MW test z-statistics -3.75 -3.14 -4.26 -4.31
(p-values) (0.0002) (0.0017) (0.0000) (0.0000)
WR scores 45.9 67.5 43.2 59.1 26.2 47.6 39.3 63.0
MW test z-statistics -3.35 -2.99 -4.18 -4.51
(p-values) (0.0008) (0.0028) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Decrease in scores 20.4 21.5 20.8 27.2 31.1 34.6 19.2 20.3
(% of unrestricted scores)
MW test z-statistics -0.188 -1.13 -0.735 -0.222
(p-values) (0.8513) (0.2575) (0.4624) (0.8240)
It is evident from Table 7 that the pattern regarding the drop in efficiency scores
after weight restrictions is consistent with what we observe under the approach of us-
ing weight restrictions defined from the average across the efficient facets in the pooled
analysis: The decrease in efficiency scores is significantly higher for the bailed-out banks
than for the non-bailed-out banks in the pooled analysis.
In Table 8, here annual analyses are performed, we see that year 2006 again witnesses
a significantly larger decrease in efficiency scores after weight restrictions amongst bailed
than non-bailed-out banks in the funding mix model. While this pattern is clear in the
funding mix model under both approaches, it is not so clear in the asset mix model.
In the asset mix model we do not find a clear pattern in terms of decrease in efficiency
scores after weight restrictions among bailed-out and non-bailed-out banks in any year.
As mentioned earlier, our asset mix model by design has to some extent accounted for risk
even without weight restrictions (as higher risk must be compensated for higher income
to achieve efficiency). This is demonstrated by the significant difference in efficiency
scores between bailed-out and non-bailed-out banks without any weight restrictions in
Table 8 (second half). By using weights of the average observation as restrictions, we
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can not find that efficiency scores of bailed-out banks drop more than non-bailed-out
banks after weight restrictions.
Table 9: Proportion of bailed-out (B) banks amongst banks with the largest decreases in
efficiency scores after weight restrictions (based on average observation): Pooled analysis
Year Decrease in scores above Decrease in scores above Total sample
the threshold of 50th percentile the threshold of 75th percentile
No.
of B
banks
No. of B
and NB
banks
% of B
banks
No.
of B
banks
No. of B
and NB
banks
% of B
banks
No. of
B
No. of B
and NB
banks
% of B
banks
Funding mix 71 133 53.4 40 69 58.0 117 286 40.9
Asset mix 62 137 45.3 32 67 47.8 117 286 40.9
Table 10: Proportion of bailed-out (B) banks amongst banks with the largest decreases in
efficiency scores after weight restrictions (base on average observation): Annual analysis
Year Decrease in scores above Decrease in scores above Total sample
the threshold of 50th percentile the threshold of 75th percentile
No.
of B
banks
No. of B
and NB
banks
% of B
banks
No.
of B
banks
No. of B
and NB
banks
% of B
banks
No. of
B
No. of B
and NB
banks
% of B
banks
Funding mix model
2006 24 54 44.4 13 18 72.2 29 71 40.8
2007 19 38 50.0 11 17 64.7 30 72 41.7
2008 14 36 38.9 12 18 66.7 29 72 40.3
2009 14 35 40.0 11 17 64.7 29 71 40.8
Asset mix model
2006 13 35 37.1 6 17 35.3 29 71 40.8
2007 13 36 36.1 6 18 33.3 30 72 41.7
2008 13 36 36.1 6 18 33.3 29 72 40.3
2009 14 35 40.0 7 17 41.2 29 71 40.8
In Table 9 and Table 10, which compares the sample proportion of bailed-out banks
to the proportion of non-bailed-out banks among those with the largest decrease in
efficiency scores (most affected by weight restrictions) in the pooled and in the an-
nual analysis respectively analysis, the results are again consistent with the approach of
weight restrictions across efficient facets: Under the average unit approach we again find
that the proportion of bailed-out banks amongst those banks most affected by weight
restrictions is higher than the sample proportion.
The list of model banks resulting from applying the average unit approach is largely
similar to that from the previous approach, both in the funding-mix model and the asset-
mix model. Using poled analysis, the set of reference banks selected using this approach
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is exactly the same as the one reported with the facet approach, i.e. BNP, DEUTSCHE,
HSBC and OP; using annual analyses we identify the following model banks based on
average observation weight restrictions: BNP, DEUTSCHE, HSBC, OP and SHB. Thus,
regardless which approach we take, it appears that DEUTSCHE, HSBC and OP are al-
ways selected as model banks.
Finally we also investigate the squared Mahalanobis distance between the average
unit and the groups of bailed-out vis-a-vis non bailed-out banks in the funding-mix and
asset-mix model in the pooled analysis.
Table 11: Squared Mahalanobis distance between groups, pooled analysis
Funding-mix model Asset-mix model
non-bailed bailed average unit non-bailed bailed (B) average unit
NB B NB B
NB 0 0
B 1.01 0 1.38 0
average unit 0.17 0.35 0 0.23 0.48 0
Table 11 shows that the average unit (in the pooled analysis) is located closer to
the group of non-bailed-banks than to the group of bailed-out banks in both models14.
Thus one would expect that the weight restrictions have a larger impact on the group of
bailed-out banks, resulting in a larger drop in efficiency scores for this group, as is indeed
the case, c.f. Table 7. Therefore the impact of weight restrictions based on the average
unit, to some extent depend on the location of the average unit relative to the groups
in question, rather than depending on how extreme the weights in the groups actually
are. Therefore we here prefer the use of the average weights across facets, which further-
more are guaranteed to be unique and non-zero (unlike the weights for the average unit).
Finally, as yet another robustness checks, we have experimented with different widths
of the ranges for the weight restrictions, in both models and under both approaches. We
find that the width of the range does not affect the relative pattern between the bailed
and non-bailed out banks identified above, but only impacts the absolute levels of the de-
creases in scores. Similarly we have experimented with using the median rather than the
mean to define weight restrictions under the facet approach, and we find that whether
we use median or average does not affect the relative pattern between the bailed and
non-bailed-out banks.
14The calculation of Mahalanobis distance has also been carried out within each year and the pattern
is the same as here.
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6 Conclusion
In performance assessments of banks using standard DEA models, extreme reliance on
certain inputs and/or outputs will tend to make a bank efficient by default. This feature
of DEA makes it unsatisfactory for evaluation of the performance of banks. The efficient
functioning of a bank often implies risks: For example, the function of modern banks of
providing transformation of funding with short maturities from depositors into securi-
ties with long maturities that borrowers desire, necessarily implies a risk. This means
that risk is an inseparable element from bank efficiency. As demonstrated by the recent
crisis, having extreme funding portfolios (especially heavy reliance on wholesale funding
as opposed to retail funding) or extreme asset portfolios (especially wrt. property loan
exposure) may be associated with excessive risk-taking, making it inappropriate to ren-
der these banks efficient by default. We therefore propose using a weight restricted DEA
model for bank efficiency analysis, where the allowable weights are restricted to ranges
determined by the average weights.
With a representative data set of over 70 of the largest banks in Europe, for the years
2006-2009, we estimate banks’ efficiency in two sets of models: a funding mix model and
an asset mix model both with and without weight restrictions. This enables us to un-
derstand potential risks associated specifically with extreme funding (and other input)
portfolios and with(loan and) asset portfolios. In the funding mix model, banks trans-
form wholesale funding, retail funding, personnel expenses, and physical capital expenses
into loans and financial assets. In the asset mix model, banks transform property loans,
non-property loans, trading financial assets and other financial assets into income (which
includes both interest and non-interest income). In addition, we also control for loan
quality and loan loss provision by including impaired loans as an input and provision for
impaired loan loss as an output in the asset mix model, and use the impaired loans as
an input in the funding mix model. The idea is to penalise bad management of problem
loans and reward prudential perception in terms of loss provision set aside by banks. All
data are collected from the audited financial reports of each bank individually, to ensure
consistency in definition, coverage, and accuracy.
We show that the decreases in efficiency scores after weight restrictions are signifi-
cantly higher for the bailed-out banks than for the non-bailed-out banks in the pooled
analysis. Moreover, we show that amongst those who have the largest decreases in effi-
ciency scores after weight restrictions, there is an over-representation of the bailed-out
banks. These results confirm the bias arising from unrestricted DEA models of rewarding
potentially risky banks with extreme asset and/or funding portfolios. We then conduct
annual analysis to see whether the banks with the largest drops in efficiency scores af-
ter weight restrictions, especially in year 2006, are associated with those which fell into
more serious trouble later during the crisis and needed bail-out. Our results confirm
this. However for the remaining years, where the crisis had already started affecting at
least some of the banks, we do not observe as clear a pattern between non-bailed and
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bailed-out banks in terms of drop in efficiency scores after weight restrictions in espe-
cially the funding mix model; in the asset mix model the bailed-out banks are already
significantly less efficient then the non-bailed-out banks even before the imposition of
weight restrictions. The results from 2007 in the annual analysis should perhaps be
taken with caution due to the transitional change in market conditions. One may ex-
pect some banks to still be pursuing highly risky activities, whereas others may already
have started to be more aware of the changes in the market conditions reacting to the
difficulties experienced by certain banks in that year (such as Northern Rock in the UK).
Applying restrictions on the weights (which reflect banks’ perception of risk adjusted
prices of funding and assets) enables us to restrict heterogeneous bank risk judgements
to belong to a certain range, determined by the average judgement. Based on the un-
derstanding of how the substantial heterogeneity in bank risk judgement can reduce the
effectiveness of proposed risk benchmarks, such as the Basel regulatory capital ratios,
we propose that our weight restricted DEA model, by restricting banks’ risk judgement,
can be used as a regulatory tool to select reference banks. The risk estimates of these
banks can then be used to create reference points for risk parameters used to define reg-
ulatory capital benchmarks (i.e. the regulatory capital ratios). This way, the discretion
in “risk weights” (inferred denominator of regulated capital ratios) will be constrained,
thus improving the effectiveness of regulatory capital ratios as regulatory benchmarks15
We present a list of banks whose weight restricted scores in both the funding and the
asset mix models are consistently above the 50th percentile with both pooled and an-
nual analysis. Among all banks, DEUTSCHE, HSBC and OP are consistently selected
as potential model banks whose internal risk estimates can be used to help regulators to
determine reference risk parameters. Within a similar policy setting, the recent study
by Knaup and Wagner (2012) proposes the use of market information (share price and
credit default swap spread) to derive an index to estimate a “risk weight” for comput-
ing regulatory capital requirements. We posit that such tools, together with the one
proposed in our study, that make use of different types of information, can complement
each other to improve the effectiveness of bank capital supervision.
15Although the consequential adjustment of weights associated with different types of assets and
funding by banks due to this supplementary regulatory tool might indirectly affect the composition of
their funding- and asset portfolios, we believe that the practice of adjusting banks’ extreme judgements
regarding the risk-adjusted prices associated with different types of funding and assets should help to
promote the stability of the system without which healthy and effective competition may not be possible.
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Appendix
Table 12: Variables used in the models
Funding mix model Asset mix model
Input variables
retail funding expenses property loan
wholesale funding expenses non-property loan
physical capital expenses trading financial assets
personnel expenses non-trading financial assets
impaired loan impared loan
Output variables
loans income
financial assets provision for impaired loan loss
Table 13: List of banks included in the sample
Bank Member
State
Total Assets
by end of
2009 (EUR
bn)
Market share
(total assets)
in EU-27 (%)
Far-reaching
restructuring
ERSTE Austria 201.7 0.5 N
RZB Austria 147.9 0.3 N
BAWAG Austria 41.2 0.1 Y
Hypo Tirol Austria 12.2 0.0 Y
HGAA Austria 41.0 0.1 Y
KBC Belgium 281.6 0.7 Y
Dexia Belgium 577.6 1.3 Y
Fortis Belgium 435.0 1.0 Y
Marfin Popular Cyprus 41.8 0.1 N
Bank of Cyprus (BoC) Cyprus 39.4 0.1 N
DANSKE Denmark 416.3 1.0 N
JYSKE Denmark 30.2 0.1 N
SYDBANK Denmark 21.2 0.0 N
OP-Pohjola (OP) Finland 80.4 0.2 N
BNP Paribas France 2057.7 4.8 N
BPCE France 1028.8 2.4 Y
Credit Agricole France 1694 3.9 N
Societe Generale (SG) France 1023.7 2.4 N
Deutsche Germany 1501 3.5 N
Commerzbank Germany 844.1 2.0 Y
Hypo Real Estate Germany 359.7 0.8 Y
LBBW Germany 411.7 1.0 Y
NordLB Germany 238.7 0.6 Y
WestLB Germany 242.3 0.6 Y
HSH Nordbank Germany 174.5 0.4 Y
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Table 13: List of banks included in the sample
Bank Member
State
Total Assets
by end of
2009 (EUR
bn)
Market share
(total assets)
in EU-27 (%)
Far-reaching
restructuring
NBoG Greece 113.4 0.3 N
EFGEurobank (EFG) Greece 84.3 0.2 N
Alpha Greece 69.6 0.2 N
Piraues Greece 54.3 0.1 N
ATE Greece 32.8 0.1 Y
TT Hellenic Postbanks Greece 18.0 0.0 N
OTP Hungary 36.1 0.1 N
FHB Hungary 3.0 0.0 N
BoI Ireland 194.1 0.5 Y
Allied Irish Bank Ireland 174.3 0.4 Y
Anglo Irish Bank Ireland 85.2 0.2 Y
UniCredit Italy 928.8 2.2 N
Intesa Sanpaolo Italy 624.8 1.5 N
Monte dei Pasche di Siena Italy 224.8 0.5 N
BPSC Italy 135.7 0.3 N
UBI Italy 122.3 0.3 N
BCEE Luxembourg 37.6 0.1 N
ING Netherlands 882.1 2.1 Y
RABO Netherlands 607.7 1.4 N
ABN AMRO Netherlands 676.3 1.6 Y
FBN Netherlands 189.8 0.4 Y
SNS Netherlands 80.3 0.2 Y
BoV Malta 6.2 0.0 N
PKO Poland 38.1 0.1 N
CGD Portugal 105.8 0.2 N
BCP Portugal 95.6 0.2 N
Espirlto Santo Portugal 78.1 0.2 N
BPI Portugal 47.4 0.1 N
NLB Slovenia 15.5 0.0 N
Santander Spain 1110.5 2.6 N
BBVA Spain 535.1 1.2 N
LA Caixa Spain 271.9 0.6 N
Caixa Catlunya Spain 63.7 0.1 Y
Caixa Tarragona Spain 10.8 0.0 Y
Caixa Manresa Spain 6.5 0.0 Y
Caixa Navarra Spain 19.5 0.0 Y
CajaSur Spain 19.0 0.0 Y
Nordea Sweden 507.5 1.2 N
SEB Sweden 225.1 0.5 N
SB Sweden 207.1 0.5 N
Swedbank (SWED) Sweden 175.1 0.4 N
RBS UK 1714.3 4.0 Y
HSBC UK 1641.3 3.8 N
36
Table 13: List of banks included in the sample
Bank Member
State
Total Assets
by end of
2009 (EUR
bn)
Market share
(total assets)
in EU-27 (%)
Far-reaching
restructuring
Barclays (BARC) UK 1552.7 3.6 N
Lloyds banking group UK 1156.7 2.7 Y
Northern Rock(NR) UK 98.5 0.2 Y
Total EU-27 27021.2
Accumulative market
share (%)
EU-27 63.0
a. Total assets include total loans, financial assets and fixed assets, calculated based on data
from banks’ audited financial statements.
b. Total assets of the EU banking system is from ECB.
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